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SYED V. M-I, LLC 
On Issue of First Impression, Ninth Circuit Holds No Extraneous 
Information Allowed in Fair Credit Reporting Act Disclosure; Such 
Violation is Willful Under Statute 
Lowell Ritter* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)1 was enacted to protect 
consumers by ensuring the accuracy and fairness of reports provided by 
consumer reporting agencies.2  The statute governs not only consumers’ 
interactions with credit card companies but also, inter alia, reports obtained 
on prospective employees as part of the employment application and 
screening process.3  Among other provisions, the statute requires that 
employers who intend to obtain such a report on an applicant or employee 
disclose the fact that a report will be sought, as well as secure the applicant’s 
authorization to do so.4 
Syed v. M-I, LLC occurred in the employment context; the issue arose 
when M-I, LLC (“M-I”) received authorization to obtain a consumer report 
on a prospective employee and later obtained a report through a third party 
consumer reporting agency, PreCheck, Inc. (“PreCheck”).5  When employers 
use third party services for background checks, as M-I did, the FCRA 
specifically requires the disclosure of the information sought and 
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 1  15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 2  See id. § 1681(a). 
 3  See id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). 
 4  Id. 
 5  Syed v. M-I, LLC, No. 14-17186, 2017 WL 1050586, at *3–4 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 
2017). 
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authorization to obtain it.6  It further requires that the disclosure and 
authorization be in a document that consists “solely” of the disclosure and 
authorization.7 
In a case of first impression for the federal appellate courts, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a liability waiver is included in the 
document that contains the disclosure and authorization information, the 
FCRA is violated based on Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)’s mandate that the 
document consist “solely” of the disclosure and authorization.8  More 
importantly, the court held that including such a liability waiver was a willful 
violation of the statute, potentially resulting in increased penalties.9 
I.     BACKGROUND 
A.   Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The FCRA provision at issue here applies to a “person,” which is 
defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, 
cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or 
agency, or other entity,” obtaining a consumer report.10  Therefore, an 
employer falls under this broad definition. 
The statute applies in a variety of circumstances when “consumer 
reports” are obtained.  A “consumer report” is defined as: 
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, 
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or 
collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in 
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for— 
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes; 
(B) employment purposes; or 
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this 
title.11 
 
 6  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). 
 7  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 8  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *1.  The decision was 3–0.  See id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b).  This broad definition is what allowed Syed to sue both the 
prospective employer (M-I) and the background check company (PreCheck).  See Syed, 2017 
WL 1050586, at *3 n.3. 
 11  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).  There are also a few limited exclusions from the term 
“consumer report” in the statute, but none of the exclusions were at issue in this case.  See id. 
§ 1681a(d)(2). 
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At issue in this case was the provision relating to obtaining a consumer 
report for “employment purposes,” defined as “a report used for the purpose 
of evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or 
retention as an employee.”12 
In order to be a “consumer report” for “employment purposes,” the 
report must be created by a consumer reporting agency.13  A “consumer 
reporting agency” is defined as: 
[A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative 
nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of 
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other 
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports 
to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate 
commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.14 
Thus, the FCRA applies only to employers who use a third party 
consumer reporting agency to obtain consumer reports on a consumer.  
“Consumer” means “an individual.”15  If an employer does not use a third 
party service, but instead conducts the check themselves, the FCRA does not 
apply because they, by definition, would not have secured a “consumer 
report.” 
The FCRA’s requirements are triggered when a person will be 
obtaining (or causing to be obtained) a consumer report from a consumer 
reporting agency for employment purposes.  This includes the disclosure to 
consumer requirement, which is at the heart of this case.  That requirement 
provides: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person may not procure a 
consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for 
employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless— 
(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in 
writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or 
caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the 
disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment 
purposes; and 
(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which 
authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause 
(i)) the procurement of the report by that person.16 
In Syed, the employer (a “person”) caused a consumer report (a 
background check) to be procured (by requesting PreCheck to procure 
 
 12  Id. § 1681a(h). 
 13   See id. § 1681a(d)(1). 
 14  Id. § 1681a(f). 
 15  Id. § 1681a(c). 
 16  Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added). 
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one).17  Thus, the requirements in section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) were 
triggered, and it is these requirements on which the court focused. 
B.   Summary of the Facts and Procedural History 
Sarmad Syed applied for employment with M-I in 2011.18  M-I provided 
Syed with a “Pre-employment Disclosure Release,” permitting PreCheck to 
obtain a consumer report on Syed, which Syed signed.19  The document 
contained not only a disclosure about the type of background check that 
would be conducted and authorization to obtain such a report, but also a 
release (or “waiver”) of liability, the function of which was to limit liability 
in the event the information obtained was inaccurate.20  The relevant release 
portion stated: 
I hereby discharge, release and indemnify prospective employer, 
PreCheck, Inc., their agents, servants and employees, and all parties that 
rely on this release and/or the information obtained with this release from 
any and all liability and claims arising by reason of the use of this release 
and dissemination of information that is false and untrue if obtained by a 
third party without verification. 
It is expressly understood that the information obtained through the use 
of this release will not be verified by PreCheck, Inc.21 
It was the above-printed release that Syed challenged because the 
statute explicitly states the document should contain “solely” the disclosure, 
with the exception of an authorization, which is expressly authorized by the 
statute.22 
Syed filed a class action lawsuit against M-I and PreCheck in May 2014 
in the Eastern District of California.23  Syed’s first complaint was dismissed 
 
 17  Syed v. M-I, LLC, No. 14-17186, 2017 WL 1050586, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2017). 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id.  
 20  Id.  The court seems to use the terms “waiver” and “release” interchangeably.  Some 
commentators suggest there is a difference between these terms.  See Bernard A. Bianchino, 
Practical Considerations in Negotiating Employee Separation Agreements, 1 AM. CORP. 
COUNSEL ASS’N DOCKET 50, 55 (1994) (“Generally at common law, a waiver of rights may 
be either retrospective or prospective in nature.  However, in general, a release refers to the 
forgiveness of accrued rights by one party.  A waiver may generally be implied from 
circumstances and does not require the receipt of consideration.  Releases, on the other hand, 
usually are formally given and require some consideration be paid to the releasor.”).  This is 
separate and distinct from a “covenant not to sue,” which is not at issue here.  See Syverson 
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the difference 
between a “release” and a “covenant not to sue”). 
 21  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at app. A. 
 22  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i); Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *3. 
 23  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *1, *3; see also Complaint at 1, 11, Syed v. M-I, LLC, 
No. 1:14-cv-00742, 2014 WL 5426862 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014).  
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for failure to state a claim, and his first amended complaint was also 
dismissed on the same basis, without leave to amend.24  The appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit followed.  The district court judge approved a settlement 
between PreCheck and all class members on January 26, 2016.25  The Ninth 
Circuit ordered oral argument for November 2016, and the court issued its 
original decision on January 20, 2017.26  Shortly thereafter, M-I petitioned 
for rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit denied.27  This resulted in an 
amended opinion, which was published March 20, 2017.28 
II.     ANALYSIS 
A.   Plaintiff Had Standing 
In May 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.29  
Indeed, it was likely Spokeo that alerted M-I, and in turn potentially the Ninth 
Circuit, to the standing issue.30  In Spokeo, the plaintiff alleged that an online 
profile generated by Spokeo contained inaccurate information.31  The Court 
analyzed the complaint under the traditional test for Article III standing.  To 
establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, a “plaintiff must have 
(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.”32  To satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement, the injury 
must be “‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.’”33  The Supreme Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit did not sufficiently analyze the injury element, remanding the case.34  
However, the Spokeo Court did note that “intangible” injuries can establish 
 
 24  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *4. 
 25  See Syed v. M-I, LLC, Civ. No. 1:14-742, 2016 WL 310135 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) 
(order granting motion for final approval of class action settlement). 
 26  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *1. 
 27  See id. 
 28  See generally id.  
 29  136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).  Interestingly, Spokeo was an appeal from the Ninth 
Circuit.  See id. at 1544–45.  The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded.  Id. at 
1550. 
 30  M-I filed its original brief with the Ninth Circuit before the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Spokeo and addressed standing in a footnote, writing that “a decision by the 
Supreme Court that the Spokeo plaintiff lacks standing would similarly mean that Syed lacks 
standing to pursue his lawsuit and that the lawsuit should be dismissed.”  Answering Brief of 
Appellee at 13 n.4, Syed, No. 14-17186, 2017 WL 1050586.  The plaintiff did not address 
standing in his opening brief or reply brief.  See generally id. 
 31  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
 32  Id. at 1547 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
 33  Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).  
 34  Id. at 1545. 
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standing, so long as the injury is still “concrete [and particularized].”35  The 
Court also seemed to leave the door open for Congress to “elevat[e]” an 
otherwise “inadequate” injury “to the status of [a] legally cognizable 
injur[y]”36 because “Congress has the power to define injuries.”37 
The Syed court also addressed the issue of standing in both its original 
opinion and the amended one, acknowledging the Supreme Court’s recently 
announced standard that “[a] plaintiff who alleges a ‘bare procedural 
violation’ of the FCRA, ‘divorced from any concrete harm,’ fails to satisfy 
Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.”38  However, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that Syed did not allege a “bare procedural violation.”39  Rather, 
the statute “creates a right to privacy by enabling applicants to withhold 
permission to obtain the report from the prospective employer, and a 
concrete injury when applicants are deprived of their ability to meaningfully 
authorize the credit check.”40  The court wrote that Congress provided a 
cause of action and “recognized the harm such violations cause, thereby 
articulating a ‘chain[] of causation that will give rise to a case or 
controversy’” under Article III.41  Therefore, the court concluded that Syed 
had standing.42 
After the Ninth Circuit’s first opinion, commentators were surprised 
and confused that Syed had standing, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Spokeo.43  It is not exactly clear what injury Syed suffered and 
 
 35  Id. at 1549. 
 36  Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578). 
 37  Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment)). 
 38  Syed v. M-I, LLC, No. 14-17186, 2017 WL 1050586, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2017) 
(quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
 39  Id.  
 40  Id.  To be precise, the correct term is “consumer report,” not “credit check.”  A credit 
report could be included in a consumer report, but a consumer report encompasses much more 
than just a credit report.  See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text.  The FCRA refers 
only to “consumer reports,” not “credit checks,” and the court seems to mean “consumer 
report.” 
 41  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1549). 
 42  Id. at *5. 
 43  See Elaina Al-Nimri & David Esquivel, In Bizarre Procedural Posture, Ninth Circuit 
Finds FCRA Willful Violation, JDSUPRA (Jan. 31, 2017), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/in-bizarre-procedural-posture-ninth-40373/ (“Also 
perplexing is the Ninth Circuit’s cursory discussion of standing under the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins.”); Kevin McGowan, No Waiver Allowed in 
Background Check Disclosure Form, 208 LAB. REL. REP. 94, 94 (Feb. 13, 2017) (paraphrasing 
Morrison Foerster attorney Angela Kleine in saying that “the court’s conclusions that an M-I 
LLC employee who wasn’t actually harmed by the form still has standing to sue and that M-
I can be sued for a ‘willful’ violation are surprising”).  In an interesting twist, the plaintiff in 
Spokeo, whose case was remanded after the Supreme Court’s decision and is still pending in 
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how this was not a “bare procedural violation.”  For example, there is no 
evidence that any inaccurate information was ever obtained or that he was 
harmed in any way by the consumer report.  Indeed, in another section of the 
opinion, the court seems to contradict the proposition that Syed suffered an 
injury.44 
The only substantive change in the court’s amended opinion was an 
additional paragraph on the standing issue.  In M-I’s petition for panel 
rehearing or rehearing en banc, standing took center stage.45  M-I argued that 
the standing question was an easy one and that “Syed has pled no real-world 
injury aside from a technical violation of the Act” and that “[w]hatever the 
metes and bounds of Article III jurisdiction, Syed’s claims fall outside 
them.”46 
The court rejected M-I’s arguments in the amended opinion and 
maintained that Syed established Article III standing.  The court added that 
Syed was deprived of his right of privacy by unknowingly signing the waiver 
along with the authorization.47  The court also pointed out that inferences are 
drawn in favor of Syed at the motion to dismiss stage and that “what suffices 
at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage may not suffice at later stages of the proceedings 
when the facts are tested.”48  It is not clear that the additional paragraph will 
satisfy those critical of the Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis, but it does show 
the court’s awareness of the potential problems with its conclusion. 
B.   Defendant Violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The court held that, by including the release with the authorization and 
disclosure, M-I violated the FCRA.49  The court began with the plain 
meaning of the text.50  The word “solely” means “‘[a]lone; singly’ or 
 
the Ninth Circuit, wrote a letter to the Ninth Circuit in January after the Syed decision was 
released, arguing that the Syed decision now compels the Ninth Circuit to rule in his favor.  
See Steven Trader, Spokeo User Says 9th Circ. Ruling Gives Him FCRA Standing, LAW360 
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.law360.com/media/articles/883961/spokeo-user-says-9th-circ-
ruling-gives-him-fcra-standing?about=media. 
 44  See Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *3 (“Syed did not seek actual damages, which would 
have required proof of actual harm.”). 
 45   Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 1, No. 14-17186, Syed, 2017 
WL 1050586. 
  46  Id. at 5–6. 
 47  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *5. 
 48   Id. at *4 n.4.  
 49   Id. at *5.  The court here seems to conflate terms when it writes that Syed signed “a 
waiver authorizing the credit check.”  Id.  The whole point of the case is that a waiver and 
authorization are two distinct things; one cannot authorize something by signing a waiver. 
 50  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
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‘[e]ntirely; exclusively.’”51  The court rejected the employer’s argument that 
that the statutory provisions in Sections 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) are 
inconsistent because the authorization (a statement including language 
authorizing the report and the actual signature) is permitted on the same 
document as the disclosure.52  Thus, the defendant argued, this is inconsistent 
with the “solely” requirement.53  However, the court found the two 
provisions consistent because the allowance of the authorization with the 
disclosure is an express exception to the “solely” language.54  Indeed, Section 
1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the statute specifically states that “authorization may 
be made on the [disclosure] document referred to in clause (i).”55 
The court further concluded that “[a]llowing an authorization on the 
same document as the disclosure is consistent with the purpose of the 
statute.”56  The disclosure and authorization provisions work “hand in 
glove,” the court reasoned, by telling applicants what they are authorizing 
and giving applicants control over whether or not to authorize the 
procurement of such a report.57  This helps to “protect consumers from 
‘improper invasion[s] of privacy,’” which is the purpose of the FCRA.58  
“Congress’s purpose would have been frustrated” by having a disclosure 
without an authorization, or vice versa.59  Therefore, based on the purpose 
and plain meaning of the statute, the court rejected M-I’s argument that the 
provisions were inconsistent.60 
The court next rejected M-I’s argument that the statute “implicitly” 
authorizes the release to be included with the disclosure.  Because Congress 
specifically included one explicit exception, allowing for the authorization 
to be placed on the same document as the disclosure, all other exceptions are 
necessarily precluded as a matter of statutory interpretation.61  The court 
again looked to the statute’s purpose and concluded that implicitly allowing 
a waiver to be included with the disclosure would not comport with the 
FCRA’s purpose, because it would “pull[] the applicant’s attention away 
 
 51  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1666 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY]). 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 56  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *6. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-185 at 35 (1995)). 
 59  Id.  
 60  Id. at *5–6. 
 61  Id. at *6.  This canon of statutory construction is known as “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.”  Id. 
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from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA by calling his attention to the 
rights he must forego if he signs the document.”62 
The court similarly rejected M-I’s argument that an explicit exception 
allows the inclusion of a waiver because a waiver is an “authorization” and 
falls under the one explicit exception.  The court relied on the fact that 
“Congress told us exactly what it meant when it described the authorization 
as encompassing only ‘the procurement of [a consumer] report.’”63  Thus, an 
authorization is not a waiver.  Even if that was not so explicitly stated, the 
court said that a “release” could not be interpreted as an “authorization” 
because the two words have fundamentally distinct meanings.64  “Authorize” 
means to “grant authority or power to,” and “waive” means to “‘give up . . . 
voluntarily’ or ‘relinquish.’”65  Therefore, the statute does not explicitly 
permit a waiver to be included with the disclosure. 
Finally, the court rejected as “irrelevant” the argument that because the 
disclosure was “clear and conspicuous,” the statutory requirement was still 
satisfied.66  The court said the “clear and conspicuous” issue is distinct from 
the “solely” requirement.67  The court further found “inexplicable” the 
Western District of North Carolina’s decision to which M-I cited,68 which 
dismissed a plaintiff’s FCRA claim with prejudice on summary judgment.  
There, the court determined: 
[I]nclusion of the waiver provision was statutorily impermissible and . . . 
the waiver is therefore invalid.  However, while invalid, the waiver—a 
single sentence within the authorization, which was kept markedly 
distinct from the disclosure language—was not so great a distraction as 
to discount the effectiveness of the disclosure and authorization 
statements.  Accordingly, the disclosure and authorization are otherwise 
adequate.69 
 
 62  Id.  
 63  Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012)). 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 51, at 120). 
 66  Id.  
 67  Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) (“[A] person may not procure a consumer 
report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to 
any consumer, unless . . . (i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to 
the consumer . . . .”). 
 68  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *7. 
 69  Smith v. Waverly Partners, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-00028, 2012 WL 3645324, at *6 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2012).  The Ninth Circuit is not the only court to take issue with this 
result, as a number of district courts have rejected this reasoning.  See Doe v. Sentech Emp’t 
Servs., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 732, 738–39 (E.D. Mich. 2016); Milbourne v. JRK Residential 
Am., LLC, 92 F. Supp. 3d 425, 432 (E.D. Va. 2015); Reardon v. ClosetMaid Corp., No. 2:08-
cv-01730, 2013 WL 6231606, at *8–9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2013). 
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C.   The Violation Was Willful 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the court found the violation to be willful.70  
This is significant because the penalties assigned to willful violations under 
the statute can be drastically higher than penalties for negligent violations.  
Under the FCRA, an employer who negligently fails to comply is liable to 
the consumer (i.e., the applicant) only for actual damages and attorney’s 
fees.71  If an employer is willfully non-compliant, they are liable for statutory 
damages from $100 to $1000 or actual damages, attorney’s fees and costs, 
and punitive damages.72  Because these damages are assessed for each 
consumer, a judgment in a class action could result in significant penalties 
for an employer. 
Syed was seeking statutory damages, meaning he had to prove 
willfulness.73  In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr, the Supreme Court defined 
willfulness as a knowing violation or an act committed in “reckless disregard 
of statutory duty.”74  The Syed court relied on Safeco for the following 
proposition: 
A party does not act in reckless disregard of the FCRA “unless the action 
is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, 
but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially 
greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely 
careless.”75 
First, the court addressed M-I’s argument that its interpretation of the 
statute was not objectively unreasonable.  The court said this is the standard 
for negligence, writing that “negligent actions are those which do not meet 
the standard of objective reasonableness” and that there could be “an 
interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) that would be objectively 
unreasonable without rising to the level of recklessness.”76  Nonetheless, the 
court addressed this argument and concluded that M-I’s interpretation was 
objectively unreasonable.77  M-I’s primary bases in support of this argument 
were that the statute was not clear and that there was no guidance on point, 
such as from a court or administrative agency, on which M-I could have 
relied.78  The court reiterated that the statute is unambiguous.79  It agreed 
 
 70  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *7–8. 
 71  15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 
 72  Id. § 1681n(a). 
 73  Id. § 1681n(a); Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *3. 
 74  Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56–57 (2007). 
 75  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *8 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69). 
 76  Id. at *9.  The court noted that the parties seemed to conflate the negligence and 
recklessness standards.  Id. 
 77  Id.  
 78  Id. at *8. 
 79  Id. at *9. 
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there was no binding authority on point, but Syed entered into evidence three 
opinion letters by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).80  The three letters 
each supported Syed’s argument81—one even specifically stated that 
including a waiver with a disclosure violates the statute.82  The court, 
however, stated that those letters were not authoritative since they were only 
informal opinion letters, citing Safeco.83  Despite having no authoritative 
guidance, the court still held that M-I’s interpretation was objectively 
unreasonable because, according to the court, no guidance was necessary to 
see that M-I’s view “comport[ed] with no reasonable interpretation of [the 
statute].”84 
Next, the court briefly addressed whether M-I’s interpretation “crossed 
the ‘negligence/recklessness line,’” such that the violation was, in fact, 
willful and not merely negligent.85  Because the provision is unambiguous, 
the court said, M-I’s subjective interpretation was irrelevant.86  Again 
focusing on the clarity of the provision at issue (“not subject to a range of 
plausible interpretations”), the court concluded that “M-I ran an 
 
 80  Id. at *8 n.6.  The FCRA was historically enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, 
but is now enforced by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF 
REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 1–2 (2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-years-experience-fair-credit-
reporting-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-interpretations/110720fcrareport.pdf (indicating that 
“[t]he CFPB also will take on primary regulatory and interpretive roles under the FCRA”).  
The Syed court, in this part of the opinion, did not mention district court cases that are on 
point.  See Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. DKC 11-1823, 2012 WL 245965 (D. Md. Jan. 25, 
2012). 
 81  See Letter from William Haynes, Attorney, Div. of Credit Practices, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, to Richard W. Hauxwell, CEO, Accufax Div., Southwest (June 12, 1998), 1998 WL 
34323756 (F.T.C.); Letter from William Haynes, Attorney, Div. of Credit Practices, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, to Harold R. Hawkey, Emp’rs Ass’n of N.J. (Dec. 18, 1997), 1997 WL 
33791224 (F.T.C.); Letter from Cynthia Lamb, Investigator, Div. of Credit Practices, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, to Richard L. Steer, Jones Hirsch Connors & Bull, P.C. (Oct. 21, 1997), 1997 
WL 33791227 (F.T.C.). 
 82  See Letter from William Haynes to Richard W. Hauxwell, supra note 81, at 1.  
 83  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *8 n.6 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 
47, 70 n.19 (2007)). 
 84  Id. at *9.  The court also analogized to the qualified immunity context where no 
existing case law is necessary to find a constitutional violation “when an officer’s conduct is 
so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without 
guidance from the courts that the action was unconstitutional.”  Id. at *8 (quoting Boyd v. 
Benton City, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 85  Id. at *9 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69). 
 86  Id.  
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‘unjustifiably high risk of violating the statute.’”87  Therefore, the violation 
was willful. 
D.   Statute of Limitations 
Finally, the court held that Syed filed his lawsuit within the statute of 
limitations.  The statute of limitations under the FCRA is the earlier of either 
“(1) 2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is 
the basis for [the employer’s] liability; or (2) 5 years after the date on which 
the violation that is the basis for such liability occurs.”88  Syed did not 
discover the violation until he was looking through his personnel file.89  The 
court reasoned that because a violation does not occur until a consumer 
report is procured, the violation did not occur when the waiver was included 
with the disclosure, and, thus, was not discoverable at that time.90  Instead, 
the violation only occurred once a report was obtained after including the 
waiver on the disclosure, and was only discovered once Syed reviewed his 
file “within the last two years.”91 
CONCLUSION 
A.   Implications for Employers 
In light of this ruling, employers who use consumer reporting agencies 
for background screens should review their disclosure forms to ensure no 
extraneous information is on the document, with the exception of an 
authorization statement and signature line.  Those employers who do not 
review their forms risk the possibility of a significant class action with 
statutory penalties of up to $1000 per violation, given the holding that such 
a violation is willful.  This is true even though a third party consumer 
reporting agency procures the report, since the statute applies to any “person” 
who causes a consumer report to be obtained.  Thus, the employer who 
requires the background check is potentially liable.  Employers should 
further be aware of the myriad of state laws that may have requirements in 
addition to the FCRA. 
Employers may attack standing going forward, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Spokeo.  By doing so, they could preclude large class 
actions in which there may be a technical violation of the statute, but no real 
injury suffered by any of the plaintiffs.  The likelihood of success is 
 
 87  Id. at *10 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70). 
 88  15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2012). 
 89  Syed, 2017 WL 1050586, at *10. 
 90  Id.  
 91  Id.  The court recognized that the facts alleged must be taken as true at the motion to 
dismiss stage.  Id.  Evidence might later prove Syed actually discovered the violation earlier, 
calling the statute of limitations issue into question.  See id. 
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dependent on the circuit in which the lawsuit is pending, with circuits such 
as the Ninth and others likely to find standing.92 
B.   Implications for Applicants 
This ruling does not necessarily have much immediate impact for 
applicants.  Applicants will now likely receive a disclosure and authorization 
without a waiver.  Applicants who do not sign any waiver would later be able 
to sue for injury resulting from an inaccurate background check.  The court 
did not address whether a liability waiver could be provided separate from 
the disclosure and authorization, with the same effect of limiting an 
applicant’s right to sue later. 
Nonetheless, this does provide plaintiffs’ attorneys new ground on 
which to base class action lawsuits alleging what defense attorneys will 
likely argue is a “bare procedural violation.”  Plaintiffs’ attorneys who find 
an employer who used the same illegal disclosure form throughout the 
United States, for example, could amass a large number of plaintiffs 
stemming from the use of a single illegal form.93 
 
 
 92  See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 640 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (reversing the district court by holding that plaintiffs had standing for violations of 
the FCRA where plaintiffs “allege[d] . . . the unauthorized dissemination of their own private 
information—the very injury that FCRA is intended to prevent” (footnote omitted)); Strubel 
v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 191 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiff who alleged a 
bank violated the disclosure provision of the Truth in Lending Act had standing, writing that 
the plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that she is at a risk of concrete and particularized harm from 
these two challenged disclosures”). 
 93  See McGowan, supra note 43. 
